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Problems with theories that equate consciousness with information or information processing.

Susan Pockett

Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience November 25, 2014 DOI: 10.3389/fnsys.2014.00225 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Commentary Peer reviewed
Keywords Information processing Consciousness Process theories Chalmers Tononi Mcfadden
Key points Argues that efforts to augment human brain function necessarily involve phenomenal consciousness, the sensory and perceptual experiences for which no scientific consensus yet exists, and contends that a major theatrical viewpoint on this question faces problems.

Abstract

Attempts to augment the function of the human brain inevitably involve in some way what Block (1995) calls phenomenal consciousness—bodily sensations and perceptual experiences—the redness of a strawberry, the smell of newly-baked bread. At present there is no consensus among scientists about what such sensory experiences are. This Opinion piece points out some problems with one of the major theatrical viewpoints on that question.

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