HEGELIAN PHENOMENOLOGY AND ROBOTICS
Donald S. Borrett, David J. H. Shih, Michael Tomko, Sarah Borrett, Hon C. Kwan
International Journal of Machine Consciousness June 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1142/s1793843011000698 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Citations | 6 |
| Key points | Proposes a regulative definition in which a robot's present sensible experience counts as meaningful to it when related to the agent's temporal horizons, and argues that such experience in evolutionary autonomous agents is embodied, contextual, and normative. Contends that a Hegelian-like dialectic can emerge in robotic experience and can serve as a constraint on developing cognitive agents. |
Abstract
A formalism is developed that treats a robot as a subject that can interpret its own experience rather than an object that is interpreted within our experience. A regulative definition of a meaningful experience in robots is proposed in which the present sensible experience is considered meaningful to the agent, as the subject of the experience, if it can be related to the agent's temporal horizons. This definition is validated by demonstrating that such an experience in evolutionary autonomous agents is embodied, contextual and normative, as is required for the maintenance of phenomenological accuracy. With this formalism it is shown how a dialectic similar to that described in Hegelian phenomenology can emerge in the robotic experience and why the presence of such a dialectic can serve as a constraint in the further development of cognitive agents.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 3
- CONSCIOUSNESS IS COMPUTATIONAL: THE LIDA MODEL OF GLOBAL WORKSPACE THEORY International Journal of Machine Consciousness May 19, 2009
- SYNTHETIC PHENOMENOLOGY International Journal of Machine Consciousness May 19, 2009
- THE POTENTIAL FOR CONSCIOUSNESS OF ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS International Journal of Machine Consciousness December 1, 2009