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HEGELIAN PHENOMENOLOGY AND ROBOTICS

Donald S. Borrett, David J. H. Shih, Michael Tomko, Sarah Borrett, Hon C. Kwan

International Journal of Machine Consciousness June 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1142/s1793843011000698 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 6
Key points Proposes a regulative definition in which a robot's present sensible experience counts as meaningful to it when related to the agent's temporal horizons, and argues that such experience in evolutionary autonomous agents is embodied, contextual, and normative. Contends that a Hegelian-like dialectic can emerge in robotic experience and can serve as a constraint on developing cognitive agents.

Abstract

A formalism is developed that treats a robot as a subject that can interpret its own experience rather than an object that is interpreted within our experience. A regulative definition of a meaningful experience in robots is proposed in which the present sensible experience is considered meaningful to the agent, as the subject of the experience, if it can be related to the agent's temporal horizons. This definition is validated by demonstrating that such an experience in evolutionary autonomous agents is embodied, contextual and normative, as is required for the maintenance of phenomenological accuracy. With this formalism it is shown how a dialectic similar to that described in Hegelian phenomenology can emerge in the robotic experience and why the presence of such a dialectic can serve as a constraint in the further development of cognitive agents.

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