Feeling Functional: A Formal Account of Artificial Phenomenology
Tarek R. Besold, Lorijn Zaadnoordijk, David Vernon
Journal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness March 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1142/s2705078521500077 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that cognitive systems research should prioritize phenomenal experiences by engineering functionally equivalent capacities, rather than replicating human feeling. Using the sense of agency as an example, the authors propose that such capacities could let artificial systems self-evaluate their state more effectively and generally than current methods, and they offer suggestions for implementing these mechanisms. |
Abstract
For humans, phenomenal experiences take up a central role in their daily interaction with the world. In this paper, we argue in favor of shifting phenomenal experiences into the focus of cognitive systems research and development. Instead of aiming to make artificial systems feel in the same way humans do, we focus on the possibilities of engineering capacities that are functionally equivalent to phenomenal experiences. These capacities can provide a different quality of input, enabling a cognitive system to self-evaluate its state in the world more effectively and with more generality than current methods allow. We ground our general argument using the example of the sense of agency. At the same time, we reflect on the broader possibilities and benefits for artificial counterparts to human phenomenal experiences and provide suggestions regarding the implementation of functionally equivalent mechanisms.
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