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SYNTHETIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Ron Chrisley

International Journal of Machine Consciousness May 19, 2009 DOI: 10.1142/s1793843009000074 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 34
Key points Argues that machine consciousness work should more explicitly address synthetic phenomenology of the first type, and that the second type can resolve problems in characterizing phenomenal states, with an example given.

Abstract

The term "synthetic phenomenology" refers to: 1) any attempt to characterize the phenomenal states possessed, or modeled by, an artefact (such as a robot); or 2) any attempt to use an artefact to help specify phenomenal states (independently of whether such states are possessed by a naturally conscious being or an artefact). The notion of synthetic phenomenology is clarified, and distinguished from some related notions. It is argued that much work in machine consciousness would benefit from being more cognizant of the need for synthetic phenomenology of the first type, and of the possible forms it may take. It is then argued that synthetic phenomenology of the second type looks set to resolve some problems confronted by standard, non-synthetic attempts at characterizing phenomenal states. An example of the second form of synthetic phenomenology is given.