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Illusory own body perceptions: case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness.

Lukas Heydrich, Sebastian Dieguez, Thomas Grunwald, Margitta Seeck, Olaf Blanke

Consciousness and Cognition September 2010 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.04.010 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Case study Case report Peer reviewed
Sample size 2
Population Two neurological patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation
Key findings In two patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation, only self-identification was abnormal, while self-location and first-person perspective remained intact. The authors propose that such global body representation disorders are distinct from related conditions and argue that these cases inform the neurobiology of bodily self-consciousness, suggesting that the three aspects of bodily self-consciousness can be selectively affected.

Abstract

Neurological disorders of body representation have for a long time suggested the importance of multisensory processing of bodily signals for self-consciousness. One such group of disorders--illusory own body perceptions affecting the entire body--has been proposed to be especially relevant in this respect, based on neurological data as well as philosophical considerations. This has recently been tested experimentally in healthy subjects showing that integration of multisensory bodily signals from the entire body with respect to the three aspects: self-location, first-person perspective, and self-identification [corrected], is crucial for bodily self-consciousness. Here we present clinical and neuroanatomical data of two neurological patients with paroxysmal disorders of full body representation in whom only one of these aspects, self-identification, was abnormal. We distinguish such disorders of global body representation from related but distinct disorders and discuss their relevance for the neurobiology of bodily self-consciousness.

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