[Neurophenomenology: Project for a Science of Past Experiences].
Andrés Segovia-Cuellar
Revista Colombiana de psiquiatria September 1, 2012 DOI: 10.1016/s0034-7450(14)60035-4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Enacción Enactive Acoplamiento sensorio motriz Ciencia cognitiva Cognitive science Neurofenomenología Neurophenomenology Sensorimotor coupling |
| Citations | 4 |
| Key points | Argues that solving classic dichotomies in mind sciences requires rejecting reductionist assumptions that treat cognition as a merely rational, individual, abstract, and disembodied mechanism. |
Abstract
Since the middle of 20(th) Century, cognitive science has been recognized as the genuine convergence field for all scientific advances in human mind studies with the mechanisms enabling knowledge. Since then, it has become a multidisciplinary area where several research disciplines and actors have acquired citizenship, allowing new expectations on the scientific study of human uniqueness. Critical assessment of the discussion that the discourse of theoretical biology has been assuming regarding the study of the cognitive phenomenon with special attention to the enactive project and, extensively, to the neuro-phenomenology of Francisco J. Varela. Starting with a brief and synthesized history of cognitive science, we will establish the key principles for understanding the emergence of the enactive paradigm and the "embodied" turn influenced by continental phenomenology in the cognitive science, as well as the general guidelines of Neurophenomenology. The "hard problem" of consciousness still faces several types of reductionism relegating the cognitive issue to a kind of merely rational, individual, abstract and disembodied mechanism, thus strengthening the functionalist paradigm in mind philosophy. A solution to classic dichotomies in mind sciences must start rejecting such assumptions.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 5
- Illusory own body perceptions: case reports and relevance for bodily self-consciousness. Consciousness and Cognition September 2010
- Horizons for the Enactive Mind: Values, Social Interaction, and Play 2010
- The Phenomenological Mind December 22, 2007
- Waves of consciousness: ongoing cortical patterns during binocular rivalry. Neuroimage September 1, 2004
- Radical embodiment: neural dynamics and consciousness. Trends in Cognitive Sciences October 1, 2001