Panpsychism, The Combination Problem, and Plural Collective Properties
Australasian Journal of Philosophy July 16, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2018.1483410 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 11 |
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism can avoid the combination problem by taking seriously plural collective properties at the fundamental level. |
Abstract
Panpsychism claims that each fundamental entity is conscious, but then faces the problem of how such entities combine to make up our ordinary consciousness. In this paper, I show how panpsychism can avoid this so-called combination problem by taking seriously plural collective properties at the fundamental level.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Our “Cognitive Limitations” and the Hard Problem of Consciousness Journal of the American Philosophical Association September 23, 2024
- Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities: Reply to Bohn Australasian Journal of Philosophy May 18, 2021
- The Selection Problem for Constitutive Panpsychism Australasian Journal of Philosophy August 21, 2020