The Selection Problem for Constitutive Panpsychism
Philip Woodward
Australasian Journal of Philosophy August 21, 2020 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2020.1804953 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that constitutive panpsychism faces an unsolved 'Selection Problem': it cannot explain how high-level functional brain states select micro-conscious qualities for bonding or blending, and that no empirically plausible solutions to this problem exist. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT Constitutive panpsychism is the doctrine that macro-level consciousness—that is, consciousness of the sort possessed by certain composite things such as humans—is built out of irreducibly mental (or proto-mental) features had by some or all of the basic physical constituents of reality. On constitutive panpsychism, changes in macro-level consciousness amount to changes in either the way that micro-conscious entities ‘bond’ or the way that micro-conscious qualities ‘blend’ (or both). I pose the ‘Selection Problem’ for constitutive panpsychism—the problem of explaining how high-level functional states of the brain ‘select’ micro-conscious qualities for bonding or blending. I argue that there are no empirically plausible solutions to this problem.
Citations in the library
Cites 3
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences March 1, 2008
- Panpsychism, The Combination Problem, and Plural Collective Properties Australasian Journal of Philosophy July 16, 2018
- The neural correlates of consciousness: Causes, confounds and constituents June 15, 2015