Panpsychism, Emergence, and Pluralities: Reply to Bohn
Australasian Journal of Philosophy May 18, 2021 DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2021.1925936 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractPluralized panpsychism, which holds that consciousness is fundamentally a property of groups of basic objects, is structurally similar to emergentism and struggles to explain how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, this view does not offer a substantial improvement over orthodox panpsychism.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences, and thus is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism. |
Abstract
ABSTRACT Einar Bohn [AJP 2019] has proposed a version of panpsychism on which consciousness is fundamentally a property of pluralities of basic objects. I argue that this pluralized panpsychism is structurally similar to emergentism, and faces the problem of explaining how a plurality of basic objects could be a subject of experiences. Because of these issues, pluralized panpsychism is not a substantial improvement on orthodox panpsychism.