Panpsychism, depsychologization of consciousness and the problem of combination

Contemporary panpsychist theories of consciousness, which propose that fundamental physical particles have their own primitive forms of experience, face serious conceptual problems that have not been resolved. The combination problem—how micro-experiences combine into unified human consciousness—remains the central challenge. Two leading solutions, Philip Goff's phenomenal bonding hypothesis and Sam Coleman's theory of mental chemistry, both suffer from internal flaws: Goff's proposal relies on a relation that cannot be understood, and Coleman's approach conflicts with basic intuitions about what experience is. The paper argues that panpsychism arises from a misguided depsychologization of consciousness in philosophy, and that the real task is not to invent more speculative theories but to rethink the field's foundational assumptions.

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Abstract

This paper examines key conceptual difficulties faced by contemporary panpsychist theories of consciousness. The author analyzes constitutive versions of Russellian panpsychism and shows that introducing microphenomenal properties as fundamental intrinsic characteristics of physical reality does not solve the hard problem of consciousness, but only renders it even more convoluted. The central target of analysis is the combination problem — the principal theoretical challenge for panpsychist frameworks. The paper critically assesses two of the most developed strategies aimed at addressing this issue: Philip Goff’s phenomenal bonding hypothesis and Sam Coleman’s theory of mental chemistry. It is argued that both approaches encounter significant internal difficulties: Goff’s proposal introduces a metaphysical relation that is epistemically opaque, while Coleman’s subject-less solution conflicts with core intuitions about the nature of phenomenal experience. The author supports and develops Keith Frankish’s thesis that contemporary panpsychism is a consequence of the depsychologization of consciousness in recent philosophical discourse. However, as the analysis demonstrates, Frankish's critique proves not only justified but genuinely productive: the philosophy of mind faces not the task of proliferating speculative metaphysical constructs, but rather the imperative of fundamentally reexamining its foundational assumptions.