Panpsychism, depsychologization of consciousness and the problem of combination

Abstract

This paper examines key conceptual difficulties faced by contemporary panpsychist theories of consciousness. The author analyzes constitutive versions of Russellian panpsychism and shows that introducing microphenomenal properties as fundamental intrinsic characteristics of physical reality does not solve the hard problem of consciousness, but only renders it even more convoluted. The central target of analysis is the combination problem — the principal theoretical challenge for panpsychist frameworks. The paper critically assesses two of the most developed strategies aimed at addressing this issue: Philip Goff’s phenomenal bonding hypothesis and Sam Coleman’s theory of mental chemistry. It is argued that both approaches encounter significant internal difficulties: Goff’s proposal introduces a metaphysical relation that is epistemically opaque, while Coleman’s subject-less solution conflicts with core intuitions about the nature of phenomenal experience. The author supports and develops Keith Frankish’s thesis that contemporary panpsychism is a consequence of the depsychologization of consciousness in recent philosophical discourse. However, as the analysis demonstrates, Frankish's critique proves not only justified but genuinely productive: the philosophy of mind faces not the task of proliferating speculative metaphysical constructs, but rather the imperative of fundamentally reexamining its foundational assumptions.