Self-defense: Deflecting Deflationary and Eliminativist Critiques of the Sense of Ownership
Frontiers in Psychology September 21, 2017 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.01612 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Sense of ownership Minimal self Mineness Deflationary account Sense of agency |
| Citations | 59 |
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenological account of the sense of ownership is deflationary because it treats the sense of ownership as implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action, and that empirical evidence supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness underpinning this sense. |
Abstract
I defend a phenomenological account of the sense of ownership as part of a minimal sense of self from those critics who propose either a deflationary or eliminativist critique. Specifically, I block the deflationary critique by showing that in fact the phenomenological account is itself a deflationary account insofar as it takes the sense of ownership to be implicit or intrinsic to experience and bodily action. I address the eliminativist view by considering empirical evidence that supports the concept of pre-reflective self-awareness, which underpins the sense of ownership. Finally, I respond to claims that phenomenology does not offer a positive account of the sense of ownership by showing the role it plays in an enactivist (action-oriented) view of embodied cognition.