Self-consciousness, ψ and φ

The paper advances an integrative account of psychological and bodily self-consciousness by adapting José Luis Bermúdez's terminology: psychological self-consciousness is called ψ-ownership and bodily self-consciousness φ-ownership. It first lays out a methodological framework for studying both domains, specifying three desiderata that apply to each, and clarifies the relationship between ownership and immunity to error through misidentification. This reveals deep similarities between the two types of self-consciousness. The paper then critically examines Bermúdez's explanation of bodily immunity to error and his defense of the phenomenology of bodily ownership, arguing that his strategy, despite his advocacy for integration, ultimately prevents the integrative project from being completed.

Study at a glance

Abstract

This paper contributes to, and underpins, the project of an integrative account of psychological and bodily self-consciousness. Following a trend in the literature that uses the notion of “ownership” to discuss self-consciousness, and adapting José Luis Bermúdez’s terminology, I refer to psychological self-consciousness as “ψ-ownership” and to bodily self-consciousness as “φ-ownership.” The paper has two main aims. First, it presents a methodological framework for the study of ψ- and φ-ownership based on the framework that Bermúdez has put forward for this purpose. My framework involves three desiderata that apply mutatis mutandis to both the ψ and the φ domains. By laying out this framework, I clarify the relationship between ownership and the epistemic phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (both in the ψ and the φ domains), and I highlight the appeal of the notion of a phenomenology of ψ- and φ-ownership. Hence, this methodological discussion helps disclose deep similarities between the very explananda of the inquiries into ψ- and φ-ownership. Second, the paper critically examines one aspect of Bermúdez’s approach to self-consciousness, namely his explanation of bodily immunity to error in view of his defense of the phenomenology of bodily ownership. In order to articulate this criticism, I leverage the conclusions of the first half of the paper about ownership and immunity. I suggest that, despite Bermúdez’s explicit advocacy for the integrative project, his strategy at this specific point prevents him from seeing this project to completion.