Phenomenal Consciousness: A Critical Analysis of Knowledge Argument, Inverted Spectrum Argument and Conceivability Argument
Journal of Advances in Education and Philosophy April 30, 2020 DOI: 10.36348/jaep.2020.v04i04.004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key points | Argues that the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness is defensible and that reductionist approaches are implausible for explaining subjective experience. |
Abstract
The objective of this paper is to defend the non-reductive thesis of phenomenal consciousness. This paper will give an overview of the arguments for the non-reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness and justify why the reductionist approach is implausible in the context of explaining phenomenal subjective experience. The debate between reductionist and non-reductionist on the project of Demystifying and Mystifying phenomenal consciousness is driven by two fundamental assumptions-1) Reductive-Naturalistic Objectivism, 2) Phenomenal Realism. There are several arguments for the irreducibility of phenomenal consciousness; this paper will focus on the inverted spectrum argument, knowledge argument, and the conceivability argument.