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The Role of Non-reductive Naturalism: Cognitive Science or Phenomenology?

Carl B. Sachs

Australasian Philosophical Review April 3, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/24740500.2018.1552103 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Citations 1
Key points Argues that Gallagher's case for a holistic, relational, non-reductionist philosophy of nature rests on a misunderstanding of the manifest image versus the scientific image. The author contends that reasons for preferring non-reductionism are internal to the scientific image's historical development, and that while enactivism may be preferable to cognitivism as a cognitive-science research program, compatibility with the manifest image is not a valid reason for that preference.

Abstract

Shaun Gallagher argues that we need a new philosophy of nature that accommodates the insights of existential phenomenology. On his view existential phenomenology needs a philosophy of nature that is holistic, relational, and non-reductionist. I argue that his reasoning is based on a misunderstanding of the difference between the manifest image and the scientific image. The reasons why we should prefer a non-reductionist philosophy of nature are internal to the historical development of the scientific image itself. We have good reasons for preferring enactivism over cognitivism as a research program for the cognitive sciences, but compatibility with the manifest image is not one of those reasons.

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