Australasian Philosophical Review
April 3, 2018
Shaun Gallagher
71 citations
Resistance to the idea that phenomenology can be relevant to cognitive scientific explanation has faced two objections advanced, respectively, from both sides of the issue: from the scientific perspective it has been suggested that phenomenology, understood as an account of first-person experience, is ultimately reducible to cognitive neuroscientific explanation; and from a phenomenological...
Australasian Philosophical Review
April 3, 2018
María Jimena Clavel Vázquez, Michael A. Wheeler
3 citations
In ‘Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science’, Gallagher [2019 Gallagher, Shaun 2019. Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science, Australasian Philosophical Review 2/2: 125–37. [Google Scholar]] sets out to overcome resistance to the idea that phenomenology is relevant to cognitive science. He argues that the relevance in question...
Australasian Philosophical Review
April 3, 2018
David Macarthur
2 citations
Shaun Gallagher’s [2019] ‘Rethinking Nature’ is an attempt to make conceptual space for the relevance of the phenomenological tradition of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, etc., to cognitive scientific explanation within an embodied enactivist approach to cognition. Since cognitive science currently presupposes orthodox scientific naturalism—for which nature is nothing over and above the objective...
Australasian Philosophical Review
April 3, 2018
Russell Meyer
1 citation
In line with proponents of 4E cognition, Gallagher [2019 Gallagher, S. 2019. Rethinking Nature: Phenomenology and a Non-reductionist Cognitive Science, Australasian Philosophical Review 2/2: 1–15. [Google Scholar]] is concerned that many cognitive phenomena are not amenable to decomposition strategies since their very nature is to be constituted extensively. By contrast the received view on...
Australasian Philosophical Review
April 3, 2018
Carl B. Sachs
1 citation
Shaun Gallagher argues that we need a new philosophy of nature that accommodates the insights of existential phenomenology. On his view existential phenomenology needs a philosophy of nature that is holistic, relational, and non-reductionist. I argue that his reasoning is based on a misunderstanding of the difference between the manifest image and the scientific image. The reasons why we should...