What makes you think you are conscious? An agnosticist manifesto.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience April 7, 2015 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2015.00170 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Keywords | Brain diseases Cognitive neuroscience Personal identity Phenomenal experience Theories of consciousness Selfhood |
| Key points | Argues that the status of "what-it-is-likeness" should be decided by empirical investigation rather than conceptual analysis, and that an agnostic stance should be maintained pending evidence to counter a bias toward fictionalism. Proposes that the experience of unity is afforded by intrinsic, multiscale brain dynamics, offering a biological substrate for unity as a regular scenario within boundary conditions, plus mechanisms that may let it go astray. |
Abstract
The qualitative character of consciousness, its "what-it-is-likeness", is a contested issue, both in philosophy and psychology. I argue that, rather than by conceptual analyses, the status of "what-it-is-likeness" has to be decided by empirical investigation. Pending the outcome, we should maintain an agnostic stance, in order to remove the bias in favor of fictionalism from our study of consciousness,. I illustrate this with the notion of "ownership unity". People adhere to the belief of a single, unified self as the owner of their experiences, in spite of abundant dis-unities in the informational content of their experience. On one reading, this supports the notion that the unity of experience is no more than a convenient fiction, based on an illusory experience of unity. Cognitive neuroscience is slanted in favor of such understanding, insofar it emphasizes functional specialization and localization. To restore the balance, I present a complementary perspective: the view that the experience of unity is afforded by the intrinsic, multiscale brain dynamics. This approach offers a biological substrate for unity of experience as a regular scenario within certain boundary conditions, as well mechanisms that may let it go astray.
Comparable studies
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| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 3
- Biology of Consciousness Frontiers in Psychology 2011
- Perceptual awareness and its neural basis: bridging experimental and theoretical paradigms. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences March 17, 2014
- Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood. Trends in Cognitive Sciences December 6, 2008