The Quest to Solve Problems That Don’t Exist: Thought Artifacts in Contemporary Ontology
Studia Humana October 1, 2017 DOI: 10.1515/sh-2017-0026 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that the 'hard problem of consciousness' under physicalism and the 'subject combination problem' under microexperientialism are thought artifacts, existing only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective ontologies, akin to semantic paradoxes, and having no grounding in empirical reality. |
Abstract
Abstract Questions about the nature of reality and consciousness remain unresolved in philosophy today, but not for lack of hypotheses. Ontologies as varied as physicalism, microexperientialism and cosmopsychism enrich the philosophical menu. Each of these ontologies faces a seemingly fundamental problem: under physicalism, for instance, we have the ‘hard problem of consciousness,’ whereas under microexperientialism we have the ‘subject combination problem.’ I argue that these problems are thought artifacts, having no grounding in empirical reality. In a manner akin to semantic paradoxes, they exist only in the internal logico-conceptual structure of their respective ontologies.
Citations in the library
Cites 7
- An information integration theory of consciousness BMC Neuroscience November 2, 2004
- Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness Dialectica 2009
- Panpsychism and Priority Cosmopsychism Oxford University Press eBooks October 20, 2016
- On the Plausibility of Idealism: Refuting Criticisms Disputatio May 1, 2017
- Panpsychism in the West September 15, 2017
and 2 more in the library