Does integrated information lack subjectivity?
Theoria, Beograd 2018 DOI: 10.2298/theo1802131n (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that Integrated Information Theory alone does not answer the hard problem of consciousness, and that even when combined with panpsychism it still cannot account for the subjective character of consciousness. |
Abstract
I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness. On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different problem, not being able to account for the subjective character of consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cites 9
- Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory Philosophical Psychology September 27, 2011
- Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness Dialectica 2009
- I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2017
- Against deflation of the subject Filozofija i Društvo March 30, 2018
- The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory PLoS Comput. Biol. September 1, 2015
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