The Phenomenological Mind
December 22, 2007 DOI: 10.4324/9780203086599 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that phenomenology is a vital resource for the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, providing a rigorous account of experience that complements empirical approaches. Proposes that understanding consciousness, time, embodiment, and intersubjectivity requires phenomenological analysis. |
Abstract
Preface to the Second Edition 1. Introduction: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, and Phenomenology 2. Methodology 3. Consciousness/Self-consciousness 4. Time 5. Intentionality 6. The Embodied Mind 7. Action 8. How we Know Others 9. Situated and Extended Minds 10. Self and Person. Bibliography. Index
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Cites 10
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Out‐of‐body experience and autoscopy of neurological origin Brain January 15, 2004
- Guiding the study of brain dynamics by using first-person data: Synchrony patterns correlate with ongoing conscious states during a simple visual task Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences January 22, 2002
- Consciousness as Intransitive Self-Consciousness: Two Views and an Argument Canadian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 2003
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