Non-representational approaches to the unconscious in the phenomenology of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences December 24, 2016 DOI: 10.1007/s11097-016-9492-9 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Citations | 24 |
| Key points | Argues that Merleau-Ponty's and Fuchs' accounts of the unconscious as a "sedimented practical schema" and Husserl's account of affective non-vivacity can reinforce one another, providing a phenomenological understanding of the unconscious as a horizontal dimension of subjective experience and a non-representational relation to the past. |
Abstract
There are two main approaches in the phenomenological understanding of the unconscious. The first explores the intentional theory of the unconscious, while the second develops a non-representational way of understanding consciousness and the unconscious. This paper aims to outline a general theoretical framework for the non-representational approach to the unconscious within the phenomenological tradition. In order to do so, I focus on three relevant theories: Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, Thomas Fuchs’ phenomenology of body memory, and Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology of affectivity. Both Merleau-Ponty and Fuchs understand the unconscious as a “sedimented practical schema” of subjective being in the world. This sedimented unconscious contributes to the way we implicitly interpret reality, fill in the gaps of uncertainty, and invest our social interactions with meaning. Husserl, however, approaches the unconscious in terms of affective non-vivacity, as a sphere of sedimentation and the horizon of the distant past which stays affectively connected to the living present. Drawing on these ideas, I argue that these two accounts can reinforce one another and provide the ground for a phenomenological understanding of the unconscious in terms of the horizontal dimension of subjective experience and a non-representational relation to the past.
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| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Patients with Disorders of Consciousness: Are They Nonconscious, Unconscious, or Subconscious? Expanding the Discussion. Brain Sciences May 17, 2023
- Levinas's Philosophy of Perception The Southern Journal of Philosophy December 1, 2017
- Making the Invisible Visible Journal für Psychologie July 1, 2023
- Affective experience in neuroscience and phenomenology: An epistemological analysis of emotions and feelings Theory & Psychology May 13, 2025