Agency and observation in knowledge of one's own thinking
Casey Doyle
European Journal of Philosophy July 11, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12378 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 6 |
| Key points | Argues that our first-person access to extended cognitive activities is agential rather than observational, because their content is not represented in phenomenal consciousness, and that the intentional character of these extended activities explains how we can have nonobservational introspective access to the discrete episodes of conscious thinking. |
Abstract
Abstract This essay addresses the question how we know our conscious thinking. Conscious thinking typically takes the form of a series of discrete episodes that constitute a complex cognitive activity. We must distinguish the discrete episodes of thinking in which a particular content is represented in phenomenal consciousness and is present “before the mind's eye” from the extended activities of which these episodes form a part. The extended activities are themselves contentful and we have first‐person access to them. But because their content is not represented in phenomenal consciousness, this access cannot be broadly observational. Instead, I argue, it is agential. Furthermore, that extended activities are intentional explains the possibility of a nonobservational form of introspective access to the discrete episodes in consciousness.