Agency and Self-Awareness
August 27, 1992 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199245611.001.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Edited volume of essays |
|---|---|
| Key points | The volume's essays argue that recent psychological and neurological claims denying consciousness a causal role in action, and declaring free will an illusion, rest on assumptions that warrant sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The abstract presents the collection as challenging those assumptions rather than endorsing the skeptical conclusions. |
Abstract
Abstract In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness.
Citations in the library
Cited by 12
- When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences June 6, 2020
- Ketamine administration in healthy volunteers reproduces aberrant agency experiences associated with schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry February 6, 2011
- The minimal self hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition October 1, 2020
- Agency and observation in knowledge of one's own thinking European Journal of Philosophy July 11, 2018
- How agency is constitutive of phenomenal consciousness: pushing the first and third-personal approaches to their limits Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences February 27, 2024
and 7 more in the library