The Easier Problem of Self-Consciousness
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that by bracketing the hard problem of consciousness, self-consciousness can be explained naturalistically as a structured, recursive organization of information flow, socially scaffolded and implemented through active inference. Proposes Active Intersubjective Inference (AISI) as an account of how self-consciousness and free agency emerge from relationally mediated self-modeling, and introduces "query acts" to mark the boundary between inferential mechanisms and reflexive self-attribution. |
Abstract
The hard problem of consciousness continues to divide philosophy and science. Rather than attempting to dissolve, reduce, or eliminate phenomenal experience, this paper proposes a methodological bracketing of consciousness itself. By performing an "epoché of consciousness," analogous to Husserl's phenomenological reduction, we set aside the question of why experience feels like anything at all and instead isolate the more tractable problem of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is treated not as an additional metaphysical ingredient but as a structured, recursive organization of information flow, socially scaffolded in development and implemented through active inference. I argue that Active Intersubjective Inference (AISI) provides a naturalistic account of how self-consciousness and free agency emerge from relationally mediated self-modeling. The concept of query acts is introduced to mark the boundary between describable inferential mechanisms and reflexive self-attribution. This reframing opens new directions for philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence while leaving the hard problem intact.