Cartesian Perspectives on Consciousness and Introspection
François Récanati
Routledge eBooks May 22, 2026 DOI: 10.4324/9781003393269-4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the Cartesian distinction between consciousness and introspection generates a dilemma for the Cogito: if the thought 'I think' is introspective, the 'stratification thesis' against self-reference undermines its reflexivity and certainty; if it is merely a manifestation of consciousness, it is unclear how it can be focused enough to be clear and distinct. The chapter discusses possible solutions within the Cartesian framework. |
Abstract
Introspection is a reflective operation through which thought takes thought itself as its object. Qua reflective operation it involves two things: the thought that introspects and the thought that is introspected. Since every thought is conscious, according to the Cartesians, it follows that consciousness is not the same thing as introspection; for if it were, each thought would have to be reflected by a further thought, at infinitum. The important thing about consciousness is that, in contrast to introspection, it involves only one thing: the thought that occurs and presents itself to the mind. The distinction between consciousness and introspection raises a dilemma regarding the Cogito . Is the thought I think a reflective, introspective thought or is it merely a manifestation of consciousness? If the former, the reflexivity of the Cogito , hence its certainty, becomes questionable, in view of the ‘stratification thesis’ which bans self-reference. If the latter, it becomes unclear how the thought I think can be focused, as it needs to be to secure its status as a clear and distinct thought. This chapter presents the dilemma and discusses possible solutions within the Cartesian framework.