Consciousness without report: insights from summary statistics and inattention ‘blindness’
Marius Usher, Zohar Z Bronfman, Shiri Talmor, Hilla Jacobson, Baruch Eitam
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences July 30, 2018 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0354 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 25 |
| Key points | Argues that transient visual awareness overflows report: new data indicate observers cannot discriminate a same/different relation without discriminating the elements themselves, suggesting summary statistics are grounded in the transient experience of elements. The authors also contend that 'inattention blindness' findings reflect task relevance affecting conceptualization and report, not a lack of visual experience. |
Abstract
We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into working memory; (ii) no specific visual elements but only statistical summaries are experienced in such conditions. We present new data showing that under data-limited conditions observers cannot discriminate a simple relation (same versus different) without discriminating the elements themselves and, based on additional computational considerations, we argue that this supports the first interpretation: summary statistics (same/different) are grounded on the transient experience of elements. Second, we examine recent data from a variant of 'inattention blindness' and argue that contrary to widespread assumptions, it provides further support for Overflow by highlighting another factor, 'task relevance', which affects the ability to conceptualize and report (but not experience) visual elements.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.
Citations in the library
Cited by 8
- Consciousness and the fallacy of misplaced objectivity. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2021
- Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access: an introduction. Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018
- When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions. Frontiers in Psychology 2023
- Consciousness and inference to the best explanation: Compiling empirical evidence supporting the access-phenomenal distinction and the overflow hypothesis. Consciousness and Cognition September 1, 2021
- Methodological issues in consciousness research: theory comparison, the role of empirical evidence, and a replication crisis. Frontiers in Psychology September 23, 2025
and 3 more in the library
Cites 6
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Perception and Iconic Memory: What Sperling Doesn't Show Mind & Language September 1, 2011
- We see more than we can report: "cost free" color phenomenality outside focal attention. Psychological Science July 1, 2014
- Consciousness and Cognitive Access Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society October 1, 2008
- Consciousness cannot be separated from function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences August 1, 2011
and 1 more in the library