2 papers in the library · 25 citations · publishing 2018-2026
August 31, 2026 Ariel Meir Berlinger, Baruch Eitam
Consciousness is often treated as unitary phenomenon. We challenge this and propose a framework that parses it into two functionally distinct representational media. Reviewing dominant theories, as well as studies of perceptual failures, neural activity, visual search and attention – we argue that phenomenal experience arises early as a detailed, analogue, and relatively generic representation...
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences July 30, 2018 Marius Usher, Zohar Z Bronfman, Shiri Talmor et al. 25 citations
We contrast two theoretical positions on the relation between phenomenal and access consciousness. First, we discuss previous data supporting a mild Overflow position, according to which transient visual awareness can overflow report. These data are open to two interpretations: (i) observers transiently experience specific visual elements outside attentional focus without encoding them into...