Moral Status and the Consciousness Criterion
The Ethics of Uncertainty November 1, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/med/9780190943646.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the Consciousness Criterion fails because consciousness is not a moral property and is not sufficient to ground moral properties, and because conscious creatures cannot be identified with certainty, so consciousness cannot be a necessary condition for personhood. Rejects the moral status project as uninformative regarding ethical permissibility. |
Abstract
Abstract The Consciousness Criterion is the claim that moral status requires consciousness, or that being conscious is a necessary condition for being a person. The idea that consciousness imbues an entity with special value, or moral status, is widely accepted in Western cultures. So much so that it is hardly questioned. It should be questioned. This chapter shows that the Consciousness Criterion fails for two reasons: 1) consciousness is not a moral property, and consciousness alone is not sufficient to ground moral properties (like being autonomous, or being a moral agent), and 2) conscious creatures cannot be identified with certainty, so consciousness is not epistemically robust enough to undergird personhood or moral status. Thus consciousness cannot be a necessary condition for being a person. The moral status project of deciding who is and is not a person is rejected as uninformative concerning what is ethically permissible.