Non-Human Moral Status: Problems with Phenomenal Consciousness.
AJOB Neurosci December 7, 2022 DOI: 10.1080/21507740.2022.2148770 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 38 |
| Key points | Argues that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, and that policies should consider psychological features independent of consciousness as potentially sufficient for moral status. |
Abstract
Consciousness-based approaches to non-human moral status maintain that consciousness is necessary for (some degree or level of) moral status. While these approaches are intuitive to many, in this paper I argue that the judgment that consciousness is necessary for moral status is not secure enough to guide policy regarding non-humans, that policies responsive to the moral status of non-humans should take seriously the possibility that psychological features independent of consciousness are sufficient for moral status. Further, I illustrate some practical consequences of calling consciousness-based views into question.