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Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness.

Conscious Cogn June 1, 1999 DOI: 10.1006/ccog.1999.0384 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics	Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points	Argues that phenomenal unity of consciousness is distinct from feature binding and proposes that a complete account of unified experience must incorporate both neural binding mechanisms and a fundamental experiential integration.

Abstract

Binding and the phenomenal unity of consciousness.

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