Panpsychist Perspectives on Free Will: Compatibilism and Libertarianism, and Constitutive and Non-constitutive Panpsychism
Tobias A. Wagner-Altendorf
Acta Analytica June 1, 2026 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-025-00656-0 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Micropsychism Emergentist panpsychism Consciousness Freedom Panlibertarianism Pan-agentialism |
| Key points | Argues that constitutive panpsychism is consistent with compatibilist free will, while emergentist panpsychism may legitimize a libertarian account of freedom. |
Abstract
Panpsychism is the unorthodox view that mentality is a fundamental and ubiquitous trait of reality. Although a clear minority position, panpsychist positions have experienced a renewed interest, starting (not only) from Chalmers’ (1995) proposal to take consciousness “as a fundamental feature of our world, alongside mass, charge, and space-time.” Various forms of the panpsychist thesis recently have been elaborated, including constitutive and non-constitutive (i.e., emergentist) types. However, the implications of panpsychist conceptions for related philosophical fields so far have only sparsely been explored. The present paper aims at clarifying the implications of panpsychist theories for the topic of free will: given a panpsychist ontology—should free will in the compatibilist or the libertarian sense be assumed? It turns out that, whereas constitutive (micro-)psychism is perfectly consistent with the compatibilist view of freedom and determinism, emergentist (non-constitutive) panpsychism might be the best metaphysical conception to systematically legitimize a libertarian account of freedom.