Panpsychism and the concept of causal significance in Gregg Rosenberg’s theory of liberal naturalism

Gregg Rosenberg's panpsychist concept of consciousness revises earlier versions of panpsychism to address mental causation and the combination problem. He proposes natural individuals defined by causal relations, where causal action consists of effective and receptive properties that impose restrictions on what the world can be, rather than producing effects. The real world emerges from a space of potentialities, with deterministic macro-individuals layered atop micro-individuals in indeterminate states, making them deterministic. Rosenberg's theory aligns with empirical science, including information integration in phenomenal experiences and relativistic space-time, and may help solve the 'hard problem' of consciousness and fundamental issues at the border of physics and metaphysics.

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Abstract

The article highlights the main ideas of the original panpsychist concept of consciousness proposed by the contemporary American philosopher Gregg Rosenberg. The philosopher proposes to revise some of the provisions of the newest versions of panpsychism in order to solve the problem of mental causation and the combination problem. To do this, he puts forward the concept of natural individuals based on an original interpretation of causal relations. Within the framework of the theory presented by Rosenberg, it is assumed that a causal action consisting of two interrelated properties — effective and receptive — is a set of restrictions that some event imposes on what the world can be, and not on the effects that it produces in the world; this system of restrictions implies that the real world arises from space of potentialities. The theory proposed by the philosopher presents the world as individuals of different orders “layered” on top of each other, where deterministic macro-individuals can exist “on top” of micro-individuals in indeterminate states, making the latter, in turn, deterministic. Rosenberg’s concept is compatible with many achievements of modern empirical sciences, including assumptions about the role of information integration in the formation of phenomenal experiences, as well as relativistic ideas about the nature of space-time. For this reason, the concept under consideration seems very promising: it is likely that its further development contributes to solving the “hard problem” of consciousness known in modern analytical philosophy and will shed light on some fundamental issues that traditionally arise on the border between physics and metaphysics.