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Who am I? Self-inquiry as a neurophenomenological approach to consciousness

Samhitha Tirumalasetti

Frontiers in Psychology September 22, 2026 DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2026.1951193 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Intervention Self-inquiry
Topics Ego dissolution
Keywords Advaita vedanta Decentering Meta-awareness Minimal phenomenal experience Minimal self
Key points Argues that self-inquiry, a first-person method from Advaita Vedanta, can be operationalized for consciousness science as a systematic phenomenology of selfhood: tracing mental contents back to the sense of "I" attenuates the "narrative self" and discloses the "minimal self," potentially facilitating nondual awareness. The authors contend the narrative self and the ownership underlying the minimal self are illusory, leaving an impersonal, reflexive consciousness, and propose the method's stepwise structure offers reproducibility, a within-practice control, and a testable attentional operation.

Abstract

Inconclusive evidence for leading third-person theories of consciousness has renewed scientific interest in its first-person nature. Self-inquiry, a first-person method from Advaita Vedanta, can be operationalized to meet this need, though it has not received prior empirical study, likely owing to Advaita’s idealism. By bracketing Advaita’s metaphysical commitments and mapping its characterization of consciousness onto the distinctions drawn by consciousness science, self-inquiry can be understood as a systematic phenomenology of selfhood. The method’s rationale is that mental contents perpetuate the “narrative self,” or one’s personal identity, so tracing such contents back to the sense of “I” to which they are referred attenuates the narrative self and discloses the “minimal self.” The minimal self is the pre-reflective first-person perspective of experience that carries a sense of “for-me-ness.” Sustained attention to the minimal self may then facilitate a selfless mode of awareness, or nondual awareness, marked by the absence of felt division between self and world. On this account, the narrative self and the appropriative ownership underlying the minimal self are seen as illusory, while an impersonal, reflexive consciousness remains. This deconstruction of selfhood already has neurophenomenological precedent, though from studies confined to Buddhist practice and reliant on idiosyncratic techniques. Self-inquiry thus holds empirical significance: its stepwise structure offers potential reproducibility across participants, a within-practice control, and a target attentional operation whose proposed distinctiveness can be empirically tested. It may also hold clinical relevance, having been proposed for incorporation into psychotherapy amid growing research into the therapeutic potential of self-attenuation.

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  • Argues that self-inquiry from Advaita Vedanta can be operationalized as a systematic phenomenology of selfhood that attenuates the narrative self and may facilitate nondual awareness.

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