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Enactivism,Computation,Dynamical Systems

Michael Wood

preprint DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4837519 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that the computational theory of mind is inadequate and that a nonlinear dynamical systems model, featuring transient strange attractors, better explains mind/brain behavior and aligns with enactivism.

Abstract

The following argues that the computational theory of mind (CTM) despite superficial similarities at the neuron level does not adequately account for brain/mind behavior as we currently understand it . It is argued rather that a mathematical dynamic (nonlinear dynamical systems) model of the brain, particularly the emergence of transient strange attractors is much more plausible as a mind/brain model. This has the advantage that it is much more compatible with the view of the brain mind from Enactivism. This could provide a basis for a unified treatment of the mind/brain.

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