The epistemic import of phenomenal consciousness
Inquiry November 12, 2022 DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2022.2144441 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that intentionalism about perception cannot explain the unique epistemic significance of phenomenal consciousness without denying either the transparency of experience or the possibility of unconscious perception, and that accepting this consequence undermines the view's own motivation that perceptual experiences justify beliefs. Proposes replacing intentionalism with an unorthodox formulation of relationalism about perception. |
Abstract
This paper controverts the ability of intentionalism about perception to account for unique epistemic signi fi cance of phenomenal consciousness. More speci fi cally, the intentionalist cannot explain the latter without denying two well-founded claims: the transparency of experience, and the possibility of unconscious perception. If they are true, intentionality of perception entails that phenomenal consciousness has no special epistemic role to play. Although some intentionalists are ready to bite this bullet, by doing so they e ff ectively undermine one of the standard motivations of their view, i.e. the claim that perceptual experiences justify beliefs. Consequently, whatever reason might there be to think that phenomenal consciousness has unique epistemic import, it is also a reason to reject intentionalism. I recommend replacing the latter with an unorthodox formulation of relationalism about perception.