Intentionality and Presence: On the Intrinsic Of-ness of Consciousness from a Transcendental-Phenomenological Perspective.
Husserl Studies April 27, 2012 DOI: 10.1007/s10743-012-9106-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness is essentially intentional and is best understood as presence-of, the coming-to-appearance of something, rather than as "qualia" or subjective feel. Contends that this presence-of is irreducible and un-naturalisable, and that naturalism cannot explain intentionality because no object is intrinsically "about" anything; only subjectivity qua consciousness is. |
Abstract
This paper discusses the nature of consciousness' intrinsic intentionality from a transcendental-phenomenological viewpoint. In recent philosophy of mind the essentially intentional character of consciousness has become obscured because the latter is predominantly understood in terms of "qualia" or the "what-it-is-like-ness" of mental states and it is hard to see why such subjective "feels", of all things, could bestow states with objective reference. As the paper attempts to demonstrate, this is an inadequate understanding of consciousness, which should instead be defined in terms of presence. Consciousness essentially takes place as presence-of, i.e., consists in something coming to appearance. This presence-of is not only a fundamental, irreducible phenomenon, but also in a radical sense un-naturalisable. Naturalism only knows "nature", as the world of objects, and the question of intentionality then seems to be how certain inner-worldly objects can be "representations" of other inner-worldly objects. In fact, no object is ever intrinsically "about" anything. This is exclusively the nature of subjectivity qua consciousness, which is not an object alongside other objects but rather exists as the manifestation of objects.