Presentational and phenomenal forces of perception
Episteme December 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1017/epi.2024.33 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the epistemic power of perceptual experience is grounded in a presentational property that is uniquely possessed in the good case and is essentially phenomenal, a position the author calls the "phenomenal presentation thesis." This is advanced against both phenomenalists, who deny the first part, and anti-phenomenalists, who deny the second. |
Abstract
Abstract Contra both phenomenalists and anti-phenomenalists, I defend the following thesis in this paper: the epistemic power of perceptual experience is grounded in its presentational property that is (i) uniquely possessed by the experience in the good case and (ii) essentially a phenomenal property. In §2, I set the ground for my argument by elaborating on the phenomenalist account of presentational phenomenology. In §3, I argue (against phenomenalism) for the first part of the phenomenal presentation thesis: (i) perceptual experience’s epistemic power is grounded in instances of a presentational property possessed by perceptual experience in the good, but not in the bad case. In §4, I argue (against anti-phenomenalists) for the second part of the phenomenal presentation thesis: (ii) presentational property is essentially a phenomenal property. In §5, I address some potential objections to the phenomenal presentation thesis. §6 concludes.