Perceptual Phenomenology
Perceptual Experience September 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192867766.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that since all awareness is constitutively representational, awareness of perceptual phenomenology is subject to a Kantian appearance/reality distinction, and that this distinction undercuts the main arguments for dualism, which assume full and unerring access to phenomenal properties' essential natures. The author also proposes extending this representationalist account to cognitive phenomenology and the phenomenology of moods and emotions. |
Abstract
Abstract Chapter 5 is concerned with the phenomenological dimensions of perceptual experience. Building on the idea that all awareness is constitutively representational, it infers that awareness is always governed by a Kantian appearance/reality distinction—there is the way that awareness represents entities as being, and the way that represented entities are in themselves. It follows that awareness of perceptual phenomenology is governed by an appearance/reality distinction. The chapter points out that the main arguments for dualism presuppose that this is not the case—they assume that awareness of phenomenal properties gives us full and unerring access to their essential natures. Hence, the Kantian appearance/reality distinction undercuts the arguments for dualism. The chapter also adds to the arguments for representationalism that are presented in Chapter 1, and maintains that its representationalist account of perceptual phenomenology can be extended so as to apply to cognitive phenomenology and the phenomenology of moods and emotions.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cites 7
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences December 1, 2007
- Consciousness and Experience Mind 2020
- Meditative analgesia: the current state of the field. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 2014
- The Consciousness Paradox November 18, 2011
and 2 more in the library