PERCEPTUAL CONTENT AND SENSORIMOTOR EXPECTATIONS
Dan Cavedon‐Taylor
The Philosophical Quarterly December 17, 2010 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.691.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 6 |
| Key points | Argues that Noë's enactivism unjustifiably privileges agent-active over object-active sensorimotor expectations, and that his off-loading considerations actually support a view restricting the body's role in perception, thereby undercutting central arguments for his position. |
Abstract
I distinguish between two kinds of sensorimotor expectations: agent‐ and object‐active ones. Alva Noë's answer to the problem of how perception acquires volumetric content illicitly privileges agent‐active expectations over object‐active expectations, though the two are explanatorily on a par. Considerations which Noë draws upon concerning how organisms may ‘off‐load’ internal processes onto the environment do not support his view that volumetric content depends on our embodiment; rather, they support a view of experience which is restrictive of the body's role in perception. My objections undercut central arguments which Noë gives for his brand of enactivism.
Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Distinguishing volumetric content from perceptual presence within a predictive processing framework. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2020
- Sensorimotor expectations and the visual field Synthese September 28, 2018
- Is perception inadequate? Husserl's case for non‐sensory objectual phenomenology in perception European Journal of Philosophy June 1, 2022