SENSORY PHENOMENOLOGY AND PERCEPTUAL CONTENT
The Philosophical Quarterly April 6, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2011.696.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that two experiences of an object reflected in a mirror can have the same spatial phenomenology while representing the object at different spatial locations, showing that sensory phenomenology does not determine intentional content. |
Abstract
The consensus in contemporary philosophy of mind is that how a perceptual experience represents the world to be is built into its sensory phenomenology. I defend an opposing view which I call ‘moderate separatism’, that an experience's sensory phenomenology does not determine how it represents the world to be. I argue for moderate separatism by pointing to two ordinary experiences which instantiate the same sensory phenomenology but differ with regard to their intentional content. Two experiences of an object reflected in a mirror can possess the same spatial phenomenology while representing that object to occupy different spatial locations. So, contrary to the current consensus, the representation of spatial location is not fixed by an experience's sensory phenomenology.