The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research August 29, 2023 DOI: 10.1111/phpr.13020 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 11 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal force is not an integral part of perceptual experience but a separate, metacognitive state, and that this metacognitive account challenges phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism about perceptual justification. After investigating alternatives, the author contends that phenomenal force's epistemic role remains marginal at best. |
Abstract
Abstract Does phenomenal force, the distinctive phenomenology attributed to perceptual experience, really form an integral part of the latter? If not, what implications does it have for perceptual justification? In this paper, I first argue for a metacognitive account, according to which phenomenal force constitutes a separate, metacognitive state. This account opens up a previously unexplored path for challenging phenomenal conservatism or dogmatism, which has been a prominent theory of perceptual justification over the past two decades. Moreover, I investigate several alternative possibilities in which phenomenal force might still be deemed as significant, but ultimately demonstrate that its epistemic role remains marginal at best.