Why I Am Not a Dualist
K. Bennett
March 18, 2021 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198845850.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that dualism fails to assuage the perceived explanatory failure of physicalism: a minimally plausible dualism would need to postulate a small stock of fundamental phenomenal properties and psychophysical laws, but it is dialectically odd to think empirical investigation could not reveal a physicalist explanation of consciousness while it could reveal those fundamental properties and laws. Of two possible forms the dualist's laws could take, one makes no progress on the hard problem of consciousness and the other replaces it with a different problem that is just as hard. |
Abstract
cI argue that dualism does not help assuage the perceived explanatory failure of physicalism. I begin with the claim that a minimally plausible dualism should only postulate a small stock of fundamental phenomenal properties and fundamental psychophysical laws: it should systematize the teeming mess of phenomenal properties and psychophysical correlations. I then argue that it is dialectically odd to think that empirical investigation could not possibly reveal a physicalist explanation of consciousness, and yet can reveal this small stock of fundamental phenomenal properties and psychophysical laws. I go on to consider a couple of different forms the dualist’s laws could take, and argue that one version makes no progress on the hard problem of consciousness, and the other replaces the hard problem with a different problem that is just as hard.