The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Cannot Explain Problem Intuitions
Journal of Consciousness Studies July 14, 2022 DOI: 10.53765/20512201.29.7.007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenal concept strategy fails to fulfill its promise of solving both the hard problem of consciousness and the meta-problem, because standard accounts cannot adequately respond to the meta-problem: the cognitive isolation of phenomenal concepts is not the basis of our problem intuitions. |
Abstract
The meta-problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining why we think there is a hard problem of consciousness. The meta-problem promises to help us solve the hard problem. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS) promises to solve both problems at once while allowing for a metaphysics of mind that avoids dualism, which is hard to defend, and illusionism, which is hard to accept. I argue that the strategy fails to fulfil this promise. Standard accounts of the PCS cannot provide an adequate response to the meta-problem because the cognitive isolation of phenomenal concepts is not the basis of our problem intuitions.