What Current Theories of Consciousness are Missing
Neurology and Neuroscience December 30, 2023 DOI: 10.33425/2692-7918.1059 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that most theories of consciousness fall short because they fail to specify either the substrate that carries information into consciousness (beyond hard-wired cell assemblies) or the brain mechanism that monitors the functional events that become conscious, and proposes several possibilities for both the substrate and the monitor. |
Abstract
Notwithstanding the power of the cell assembly concept, which holds that specific patterns of neuronal activity constitute the substrate of perceptual awareness that rises into consciousness, a explanatory gap remains between the phenomenological experience of consciousness and the brain processes from which that experience arises. A number of compelling and insightful theories have been offered that attempt to bridge that gap, but most of them fall short by failing to [a] specify which of many options other than hard-wired cell assemblies carry the information that becomes conscious, or [b] identify the brain mechanism for monitoring the functional events that become conscious. This Viewpoint article points to a number of possibilities that could be considered for both the substrate and monitor that give rise to consciousness.