Challenges for theories of consciousness: seeing or knowing, the missing ingredient and how to deal with panpsychism.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences September 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2017.0344 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe study of consciousness has advanced with promising theories and experimental data, but new challenges persist. A key debate is whether visual consciousness involves the seeing itself (phenomenal consciousness, or P-consciousness) or the knowledge that you see (cognitive access, or A-consciousness), and this controversy appears deadlocked. Additionally, many theories imply panpsychism—the idea that all beings or even lifeless objects have conscious experience—raising the question of whether this should be accepted or whether missing ingredients are needed to set a lower bound on conscious beings. The text discusses these challenges and offers potential solutions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Access Consciousness Panpsychism Phenomenal Recurrent processing |
| Key finding | Argues that the debate between phenomenal and cognitive accounts of visual consciousness is at a stalemate and that the panpsychist implications of many theories require further specification of 'missing ingredients' to set boundaries on conscious entities. |
Abstract
Significant progress has been made in the study of consciousness. Promising theories have been developed and a wealth of experimental data has been generated, both guiding us towards a better understanding of this complex phenomenon. However, new challenges have surfaced. Is visual consciousness about the seeing or the knowing that you see? Controversy about whether the conscious experience is better explained by theories that focus on phenomenal (P-consciousness) or cognitive aspects (A-consciousness) remains, and the debate seems to reach a stalemate. Can we ever resolve this? A further challenge is that many theories of consciousness seem to endorse high degrees of panpsychism-the notion that all beings or even lifeless objects have conscious experience. Should we accept this, or does it imply that these theories require further ingredients that would put a lower bound on beings or devices that have conscious experience? If so, what could these 'missing ingredients' be? These challenges are discussed, and potential solutions are offered.This article is part of the theme issue 'Perceptual consciousness and cognitive access'.