Mindscape Collective is now The Consciousness Library. Same library, new name. You may need to sign in again. About the change
Skip to content

Biological Versus Artificial Consciousness: Will The Two Ever Meet?

W. Krömer

Neurology and Neuroscience February 2, 2026 DOI: 10.33425/2692-7918.1119 (opens in new tab) via OpenAlex

Summary

AI-generated from the abstract

Self-consciousness in biological organisms depends on an individual's ability to distinguish sensory input from its environment from input arising from its own body, a process grounded in embodiment. Artificial systems, by contrast, lack this embodied distinction because software processes input but does not substitute for a body. To replicate biological self-consciousness, an artificial system would need hardware with a comprehensive sensorium integrated throughout its material, software that can separate bodily from environmental signals, bidirectional communication between hardware and software, and the capacity to integrate bodily signals into a unified sense of self. Meeting these requirements in non-living material is considered unlikely.

Study at a glance

Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Key lock Artificial life Component thermodynamics Software system Computer science
Key finding Argues that artificial systems are unlikely to achieve biological self-consciousness because they lack the necessary embodiment and integration of bodily signals.

Abstract

The present opinion article first discusses the fundamental basis of self-consciousness (self-awareness).The biological situation is then compared to artificial systems. Actually, the deficiencies of artificial systems will highlight the key features of biological systems. Biological self-consciousness requires an individual to whom something can become conscious, which basically depends on the organism’s ability to distinguish between sensory input from its environment versus its body (embodiment). As any software only provides the tools for processing input, but does notper se substitute for embodiment, applying the above principle to an artificial system would require its “body“ (hardware inclusive of the robot’s encasement and its functional parts) being equipped with acomplex sensorium penetrating the whole material. Moreover, input from the latter would have to be distinguished by the software from any environmental input, and the hardware’s sensorium would have to be capable to communicate with the software in a bidirectional manner similar to the biological situation. Also, the artificial system would have to be able to integrate these “bodily“ signals such that they are “experienced“ as all belonging to one and the same “individual“ entity, as it is the case in abiological system. It is considered unlikely to meet such highly complex requirements in a dead material.

Comments

No comments yet.

Log in to comment