Self-Awareness and the “I” in the Phenomenological Tradition

The Phenomenological tradition rethinks the self and self-awareness by emphasizing the first-person perspective and a hierarchical model of experience. This chapter traces key developments from Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty to later writers such as Henry. It positions Phenomenology's account of self-awareness between Brentano's spectatorial model and Kantian intellectualism. Innovations include Sartre's non-positional self-consciousness, Heidegger's links between self and society, and Merleau-Ponty's conception of embodiment.

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Abstract

The Phenomenological tradition is defined by its attempt to rethink the self and self-awareness. This chapter provides an overview of some of the fundamental developments within that tradition running from Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty to later writers such as Henry. I begin by sketching the key features: its relationship to naturalistic and transcendental approaches, the centrality of the first person perspective, and the hierarchical model which is central to Phenomenology’s vision of experience. I next introduce the specifics of Phenomenology’s picture of self-awareness, positioning it between the spectatorial model found in Brentano and a Kantian intellectualism. I then turn to some key innovations: Sartre’s notion of non-positional self-consciousness, Heidegger on the links between the self and the social, and finally Merleau-Ponty’s conception of embodiment.