Progress in Understanding Consciousness? Easy and Hard Problems, and Philosophical and Empirical Perspectives
Tobias A. Wagner-Altendorf
Acta Analytica December 1, 2024 DOI: 10.1007/s12136-024-00584-5 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that while empirical progress on the neural correlates of consciousness is indisputable, philosophical progress on the hard problem of consciousness has been much less pronounced. The author contends that Chalmers was correct to distinguish the two problem types but overly optimistic in predicting progress on the hard problem, and that empirical and philosophical progress are essentially uncoupled. |
Abstract
AbstractDavid Chalmers has distinguished the “hard” and the “easy” problem of consciousness, arguing that progress on the “easy problem”—on pinpointing the physical/neural correlates of consciousness—will not necessarily involve progress on the hard problem—on explaining why consciousness, in the first place, emerges from physical processing. Chalmers, however, was hopeful that refined theorizing would eventually yield philosophical progress. In particular, he argued that panpsychism might be a candidate account to solve the hard problem. Here, I provide a concise stock-take on both the empirical-neuroscientific and philosophical-conceptual progress on consciousness. It turns out that, whereas empirical progress is indisputable, philosophical progress is much less pronounced. While Chalmers was right, I argue, in distinguishing distinctive types of problems of consciousness, his prediction of progress on the hard problem was overly optimistic. Empirical progress and philosophical progress are essentially uncoupled; a more skeptical perspective on progress in philosophy in general is appropriate.
Comparable studies
Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.
| Study | Year | Design | Participants |
|---|---|---|---|
| Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. | 2003 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| From dopamine to salience to psychosis--linking biology, pharmacology and phenomenology of psychosis. | 2005 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| How do the brain's time and space mediate consciousness and its different dimensions? Temporo-spatial theory of consciousness (TTC). | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
Cites 20
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Neural correlates of consciousness: progress and problems Nature Reviews Neuroscience April 20, 2016
- Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto Biological Bulletin December 1, 2008
- Theories of consciousness. Nature Reviews Neuroscience July 1, 2022
- Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism Oxford University Press eBooks May 29, 2008
and 15 more in the library