The Hard Problem
Edward J. Neafsey
Science April 23, 2009 DOI: 10.1126/science.324_463c (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that the claim neuroscience may eventually explain all facets of being human reflects a naive faith in scientific progress, and that the "hard problem" of consciousness remains unsolved, so personal beliefs about it should not be presented as knowledge. |
Abstract
In the letter “Neuroscience and the soul” (27 February, p. 1168), M. J. Farah and N. Murphy state that eventually neuroscience and the material system it describes may be able to explain all facets of being human. This idea strikes me as a somewhat naïve and simple faith in scientific progress rather than an accurate assessment of current thinking on this issue. Some years ago, the philosopher David Chalmers referred to the problem of consciousness (how physical processes in the brain give rise to subjective experience) as the “hard problem” (1). We are no closer to knowing or understanding how this happens today, so the problem remains hard and should be acknowledged as hard. In the absence of such understanding, personal opinions and beliefs about this question should not be presented as genuine knowledge.