Defining consciousness and denying its existence. Sailing between Charybdis and Scylla
Philosophical Studies February 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-025-02285-0 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that illusionism can avoid strawmanning phenomenal realists by adopting a supposedly innocent definition of phenomenal consciousness that is explicitly innocent but implicitly loaded, and that overt strong illusionism is preferable to a weak phenomenal realist reformulation that merely salvages the position verbally. |
Abstract
Ulysses, the strong illusionist, sails towards the Strait of Definitions. On his left, Charybdis defines “phenomenal consciousness” in a loaded manner, which makes it a problematic entity from a physicalist and naturalistic point of view. This renders illusionism attractive, but at the cost of committing a potential strawman against its opponents – phenomenal realists. On the right, Scylla defines “phenomenal consciousness” innocently. This seems to render illusionism unattractive. Against this, I show that Ulysses can pass the Strait of Definitions. He should sail straight towards Scylla. Supposedly innocent definitions land a concept that makes illusionism attractive without committing a strawman. Indeed, this concept, which captures what the phenomenal realist means, is explicitly innocent but implicitly loaded. Beyond the Strait lies another danger: the Sirens of Redefinitions. They incite our hero to redefine his terms to salvage verbally (weak) phenomenal realism – judged preferable to overt strong illusionism. Ulysses should resist the Sirens’ songs and choose overt strong illusionism over its weak realist reformulation.
Citations in the library
Cited by 8
- The Science of Sirens June 11, 2026
- Arguing for Illusionism June 11, 2026
- Leaving the House of Mirrors June 11, 2026
- A Bundle of Mysteries June 11, 2026
- Addressing Objections June 11, 2026
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Cites 11
- On a confusion about a function of consciousness Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995
- Phenomenal Consciousness Cambridge University Press eBooks September 28, 2000
- Should a materialist believe in Qualia? Australasian Journal of Philosophy March 1, 1995
- Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem Philosophical Psychology October 25, 2017
- Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge 2007
and 6 more in the library