Phenomenal intentionality and the sense of togetherness: a defense of the consciousness-first approach to collective intentionality
Synthese June 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1007/s11229-025-05055-x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that collective intentionality should be considered phenomenal-intentional, namely an intentional property that obtains in virtue of a specific experiential property the author calls "the sense of togetherness." This "consciousness-first" approach holds that shared experience grounds shared intentionality. |
Abstract
What is the relationship between the sense of togetherness and collective intentionality? While the nature of the relationship between phenomenal and intentional properties has been the subject of an extensive literature for individual mental states, it has rarely been scrutinized in the case of collective or shared mental states. In this paper, I propose to account for this relationship by defending a “consciousness-first” approach to collective intentionality. More precisely, I argue that collective intentionality should be considered as phenomenal-intentional, namely as an intentional property that obtains in virtue of a specific experiential property that I call “the sense of togetherness”.